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How to think a puppet 
 




Abstract: There is a growing awareness of the relevance of cognitive neuroscience to 
performance studies, but little attention has been paid to puppetry in this context. In an attempt to 
open up the  field of puppetry to McConachie’s’cognitive turn’, a cognitive approach is here taken to 
Blind Summit’s ‘The Table’. The solo puppet protagonist Moses is described here as a ‘brain on 
legs’, a lively, funny and poignant figure who hovers on the brink of epic greatness but remains 
forever fixed to his table top. ‘The Table’ is analysed from three angles : firstly the use of 
environmental ‘affordances’ in James Gibson’s sense ; secondly kinesthetic empathy as described by 
Antonio Damasio, Shaun Gallagher et alia ; and thirdly,intimately linked to both, emotion. It is by 
virtue of  Moses’s limitations that we are able to glimpse our own potential as human beings, richly 
embedded as we (and his operators) are in a world  of limitless ‘affordances’ or ‘opportunities for 
action’ in James Gibson’s sense ; and able to grow cognitively and emotionally through our contact 
with others.     
 
 
The opening up of performance to cognitive studies was prepared towards the end of the 1980s 
with the gradual turn from reliance on semiotic analysis of the stage towards phenomenological 
approaches as a tool for the rigorous analysis of first person experience.
1
 During the same period 
cognitive neuroscientists turned their attention to consciousness and began to study subjective 
experiences of the mind
2
. Panksepp, a leading affective  neuroscientist and perhaps the best known 
researcher into emotions through his practical research into the neural circuits and chemical changes 
in the brain, describes the need for flexible approaches to understanding the whole person in relation 
to the problem of consciousness:  
.....science only clarifies functional parts of a complex phenomenon. Other disciplines, from art to philosophy, 
are needed to reconstruct an image of the whole...3 (emphasis in original) 
As  neuroscience started to listen to other disciplines, a reciprocal field of cognition studies opened 
up that takes account of developments in hard (neuro)science, and this field embraces psychology, 
philosophy, anthropology- indeed potentially almost any humanities discipline, including, recently, 
performance studies. These scholars are interested in neuroscience for what it tells us about how we 
may cognize our being in the world, tending to draw on controversial essentialist insights into how the 
mind works
4
. This dialogue promises to advance embodied understandings of the mind deriving from 
philosophy, by using firmer evidence from neuroscience about how our consciousness is formed.
5
 
Whilst  the dialogue is perhaps rather one sided currently,
6
 in performance studies it is becoming 
evident that in the face of cognitive understandings, many writers may have to modify well-worn 
theories rooted within psycho-analytic and social constructivist thinking.
7
 Scenography and puppetry 
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have always yielded more readily to phenomenological rather than (for example) Freudian or Marxist 
interpretations, and it seems a natural development to examine more closely the ‘first person’ 
approaches within cognitive neuroscience, in an attempt to tease out key aspects of how meaning 
emerges on stage through its visual and haptic components. One key aspect, and increasingly so in the 
contemporary theatre, is puppetry.  
Steve Tillis in 1992 made an exhaustive critique of the then current and largely semiotic 
definitions of  the puppet and what he judged to be the hitherto unworkable taxonomies based either 
on variations in manipulating techniques or on diachronic categorisations through history and/or 
geography.
8
 His study illustrates the difficulties in defining the enormous and diverse field that is  
puppetry and warn against any assumed definition of a ‘puppet’: these include rod, string, glove, 
‘table  top’and Bunraku puppets.9 Moreover Tillis’s  book dates from 1992 before digital puppetry 
and computer aided design had been developed, all of which  further complicate notions of what a 
puppet is or might be
10
. To these varieties of ‘2D’puppets we  might  add simple cut out, shadow and 
UV puppets.  
Jurkowski offers perhaps the most  useful definition of a puppet since he acknowledges the 
semiological and ultimately dramaturgical  impact of what he describes as variations in the ‘power 
sources’: 
…[T]he  speaking and performing object makes  temporal use of the  physical sources of the vocal and  motor 
powers, which are present outside the object. The relations between the object (the puppet) and the power 
sources....change all the time and their variations are of great semiological significance.
 11
  
Importantly for my purpose, Jurkowski’s definition is able to encompass a  relatively recent 
phenomenon, the ‘manipulactor’ who is  part  puppeteer and part  visible ‘independent’ performer 
interacting with it
12. ‘Manipulacting’ is a development from the visible puppeteer who began to 
appear on our  stages after World War Two. In manipulacting the ‘relations between the object (the 
puppet) and the power sources…change all the time’ with, as  Jurkowski notes, changed semiological- 
and I would add, dramaturgical- significance. In de-emphasising what a puppet is in favour of what a 
puppet  does, Jukowski prepares the ground for a  cognitive approach. I argue that it is the 
intentionality of operator and audience that ultimately makes the  puppet ‘do’. In this sense recent 
developments in cognitive  science, which is closely allied to phenomenology and first person 
experience, is a promising tool to analyse kinesthetic, empathic and emotional responses when a  
puppet  moves. I should offer a caveat: this article is largely concerned with the study of a single 
anthropomorphic puppet and his ‘manipulactors’. Although an attempt  will be made towards the end 
to widen the scope of the cognitive insights here presented, a full study is outside the scope of this 
article. I am concerned here to extract a few key pointers which may map out an initial pathway in 
this largely untried approach to puppetry. 
Jurowkski draws attention to the ‘motor  powers’ outside the puppet/object that move it (i.e. the 
motor powers of the  operator).  The somato-sensory area of the  brain appears to be closely allied, as 
we shall see, to emotion, empathy and memory.
13
  Tillis’s  syncretic analysis is in the end limited by 
the failure to explain the ‘psychological desire’ of the audience to ‘imagine that the perceived  object 
does, in fact, have life’ (Tillis 1992:64). The psychology of the audience often reduces theorists to 
vague speculation of what they think is happening
14
 whereas neuro-science may offer a more  precise 
tool of analysis. The  singular puppet I have chosen to look at through this lens is Moses: the 
marionette porté or ‘table  top puppet’ (Illust.1) who stars in The Table (2011),  the  creation of Blind 
Summit Theatre. As cognitive studies is a lens to look at Moses, so  Moses is our lens (and not as a 
universal representative of  ‘the puppet’) to look at puppetry. In my case study, Moses, a table top 
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figure, a little man with a large head and  tiny legs and no clothes- moves through physical sources 
‘present outside the object’- the three operators who grip his  head, body, feet and hands. 
In addition to ‘manipulacting’, The Table is an example of what Roman Paska describes as the 
‘Primitivist’ rather than ‘Illusionist’ use of  puppetry. In  ‘Illusionism’ the ‘puppet-as-object’ 
succumbs to pure  character  representation and ‘ the  signifying puppet dematerialises into  pure  
simulation’ (Paska in Francis: 2011: 138-9). Paska argues that the  twentieth century brought a sea 
change from ‘Illusionism’ to ‘Primitivism’: puppets became flexible and resonant theatrical tools 
where, as Jukowski describes it, ‘the performer does not serve the puppet anymore; he makes the 
puppet serve him and his ideas’  (Jurkowski 1990:17).Similarly Didier Plassard has  argued that the  
physical relationship between puppet and  puppeteer has changed from ‘vertical’ to ‘horizontal’,that is 
the  manipulator and manipulated hold more equal presence on stage.
15
 The Table exploits- and  
deconstructs-this ‘new’ dramaturgy of the puppet. In (post)modern puppetry typically the human 
figure, most  frequently but not  always as operator, appears alongside the puppet, complicating 
audience perception and multiplying levels of interpretation through the visible juxtaposition of living  
flesh and the plastic  object that flesh causes to move. Moses is the star but ‘his’ existential life 
problems that are the life blood, poignancy and black humour of this piece only exist by virtue of the  
presence of his three operators (and silent  female visitor to his table)  and only have  meaning in 
relation to them- and the audience. As always in theatre, the  metaphor is not a literary or abstract one 
but one  acted out in  flesh and  blood and objects in front of our  eyes.  
What is particularly apposite in this discussion on puppets and cognition is that Moses is a huge 
head on a small body (see Fig.1). He threatens to perform to us his epic on the last twelve hours of 
Moses’s life, in ‘real time’, the ostensible reason for the performance. Before we realise who he is and 
what he intends, his large cardboard head and tiny body impacts upon us. The audience reception of 
Moses can be treated as a rich ‘conceptual  blend’ that resonates throughout the  piece. Conceptual  
blending is a notion borrowed from cognitive  linguisitics
16
 and the ‘network model’ is adapted here 
to explain the physical and tactile and essentially phenomenological ‘blend’ that Moses offers us.17 
Conceptual blending describes the ‘conceptual  integration’18 of existing mental spaces (broadly 
comparable to  thoughts) which make up new mental spaces. According to Fauconnier and Turner a 
new blend begins with (however  many) input spaces, and ‘cross space mapping’ connects what is 
common  between the input spaces to create the ‘generic space’. (The  process is not linear and  
isolated though it has to be  described that way- blending and  cross mapping is a continual and 
complex process.) The fourth mental space is the creative leap : the ‘blended space’ or ‘the blend’ i.e. 
a new mental space. New ‘emergent structure’ is developed through the blend so that ‘composition of  
elements from the  inputs makes relations available in the  blend that do not exist in the separate 
inputs’.19 In the  word s of  Edwin Hutchins, ‘As is the case with all blends, cross-space mappings 
between conceptual and material elements link the two spaces and selective projection from the inputs 
into the blended space give rise to emergent properties.’20 When we first see Moses on the table, one 
‘input space’ is, I suggest, the large headed figure/puppet, and another ‘input space’ is our ‘body  
image’ which is the perception of our own bodies we carry in our heads, i.e.we feel our own heads 
and especially our faces to be much huger than they actually are.
21
 Moses reminds us of our unnoticed 
shaping of our large headed ‘window’ to the world, the world which is also our own ‘table  top’. This 
is what Fauconnier and Turner describe as ‘the  flash of comprehension’.22 Moses, though a very 
different ‘other’, is also us and despite the bizarre nature of his appearance we feel strangely empathic 
with him. In all puppets that work particularly well, the exact choice of material nuances the meaning. 
The huge head is made of corrugated card, a massive and impressive bulk, but essentially empty. The 
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unseen kinks and whorls of the familiar material of corrugated card, faintly ridged on the surface and 
carefully crafted into the angled and rigid shapes making up a head, remind us of a brain on legs. 
 
The table itself, comprising the entire staging of this  piece, present  throughout, and Moses’s 
‘stage’, home and entire universe, is, in Lakoff and Johnson’s definition, a basic level concept.23 Basic 
level concepts are a way the mind categorises objects: these concepts do not change, and they derive 
from bodily experience. Basic level concepts are the ‘lowest’ generic form of an object that we can 
visualise, for example, ‘chair’ –or table- rather than ‘furniture’: to put it succinctly, ‘categories of the 
mind fit the categories of the world’ (emphasis in the original).24 They are ‘”human sized”’  and  
depend  ‘not on the objects themselves, independent of people, but on the way people interact with 
objects, the way they perceive them, image them, organize information about them, and behave 
towards them with their bodies’.25 The ‘visualisation’ of basic level categories derives from 
‘handlings’ and interaction with the environment. In this sense the word ‘visualise’ is very deceptive 
and inadequate, and ignores the physical and haptic dimensions of thought. Alva Noë describes seeing 
as ‘much more like touching than it is like depicting’.26 In handling a puppet like Moses there is for 
the puppeteer a curious mixture of the haptic and the visual, internal proprioreception and an external 
sense of touch/vision. Working a puppet draws on sensori-motor memory, especially the stringed 
marionette and figures half worn and incorporating the hand(s) and/or feet of the puppeteer, or, as in 
Moses, figures grasped and manipulated by up to three operators (a Bunraku style puppet or a 
marionette porté). For the puppeteer, the effort of moving the puppet into positions that resemble the 
actual creature they are imitating inevitably and always draws upon such body memory, as well as an 
acute visual and haptic empathy with what is being seen by the audience
27
: the better they are able to 
embody these memories the better the puppetry produced. It is no accident  that Moses moves or 
rather is moved on a ‘basic level  category’  object, a table, returning both puppeteer and audience 
member to a ‘human sized’ object, rehearsing early stages in the brain’s development of concepts- up 
and down, over and  under, edges and  surfaces, and  so  on. 
Neuro-scientist Antonio Damasio believes: ‘There is no such thing as a pure perception of an 
object within a sensory channel...To perceive an object, visually or otherwise, the organism requires 
both specialized sensory signals and signals from the adjustment of the body, which are necessary for 
perception to occur’28 (i.e. the shift of the head upwards in order to see a bird in flight, the bending of 
the body into a chair, the curving of a hand to work a puppet’s  head). Even witnessing such 
interaction, as an audience, is a similar experience: this motor element in perception or 
proprioreception survives vividly when we even think of that object
29: ‘The records we hold of the 
objects and events that we once perceived include the motor adjustments we made to obtain the 
perception in the first place and also include the emotional reactions we had then. They are all co 
registered in memory.....You simply cannot escape the affectation of your organism, motor and 
emotional most of all, that is part and parcel of having a mind’.30 These proprioreceptive, haptically 
strong body memories are writ large upon the stage, especially in the use of puppets : so too is affect 
or the rousing of  emotion, prompted as Damasio says by an object- or puppet.  
Leaving  aside forthe time being the  important element of emotion that Damasio attaches to motor 
memory here, my suggestion is that  Moses has connection via motion (of puppet,  puppeteer and 
watcher) with basic level concepts. Similarly, Moses also reminds us of basic patterns of  motion such 
as the impulse of SOURCE-PATH-GOAL. These patterns were first identified by the philosopher 
Mark Johnson
31
 and developed through his work with linguist George Lakoff.
 32
 These patterns 
develop from babyhood onwards and are now accepted by many neuroscientists (but by no means 
all
33
) as the structural scaffolding, via metaphorical mappings, for abstract thinking: in other words 
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our reason and our imagination are founded in a necessary and essentialist bodily relation with, and 
use of, the material world.
34
 We cannot, they maintain, do much thinking without metaphor, and they 
ground metaphor in bodily experience. Metaphors identified by Lakoff and Johnson include many 
‘spatial relations concepts and image schemas’.35 One such is the container image schema: for 
example when we say ‘the bee is in the garden’ we are ‘imposing an imaginative container structure 
on the garden’36; such structure emerges from  numerous experiences when young such as being  
wrapped up in a  blanket as a new born  baby,  learning to pour water in and out of beakers in the  
bath, and playing  hide and  seek. Another is the strong ‘front and back’ image schema : in an 
expression such as ‘the cat is behind the tree’ we are actually imposing a front and back on a tree, 
which is directly derived from our own body image of front and back and where we are placed in 
relation to the tree. Moses continually operates on the level of these basic patterns of bodily 
orientation, confined as he is on a very limited surface in the centre of a void. Prepositions for Moses 
seem particularly important as he shows us around his flat, rectangular world : he needs the geometry 
of his table top to have any sense of space. When Moses shows us around his ‘garden’ on the  table  
top, we feel he is ‘in’ it ; moreover he has a very clear idea when standing at the edge of the 
garden/tablethat he is contemplating the ‘garden’ spread out before him.The container metaphor is 
strongly present throughout: the table itself of course is Moses’s ‘container’ in  the void of the stage 
that surrounds him. Lakoff and Johnson demonstrate how metaphorical thinking derives from such 
bodily experience and it begins before birth moving in the womb. Moreover the very perception of 
objects is shaped by bodily interactions with them and it is this that The Table, by reason of Moses’s 
incredibly limited physical world, plays with.  
When you and I look at an object outside ourselves, we form comparable images in our respective brains. We know 
this well because you and I can describe the object in very similar ways, down to fine details. But that does not mean 
that the image we see is the copy of whatever the object outside is like. Whatever it is like in absolute terms, we do 
not know. The image we see is based on changes which occurred in our organisms-including the part of the organism 
called brain- when the physical structure of the object interacts with the body. The signalling devices located 
throughout our body structure-in the skin, in the muscles, in the retina, and so on, help construct neural patterns 
which map the organism’s interaction with the object. The neural patterns are constructed according to the brain’s 
own conventions, and are achieved transiently in the multiple sensory and motor regions of the brain that are suitable 
to process signals coming from particular body sites, say the  skin, or the muscles, or the retina. The building of 
those neural patterns or maps is based on the momentary selection of neurons and circuits engaged by the interaction. 
In other words, the building blocks exist within the brain, available to be picked up and assembled. The part of the 
pattern that remains in memory is built according to the same principles.... 
...There is a set of correspondences between physical characteristics of the object and modes of reaction of the 
organism according to which an internally generated image is constructed.37 
The development of the basic capacity to grasp and make use of the environment is the shared and 
essentialist basis of different cultures and civilisations, but the capacity to do this does not determine 
the nature of cultures themselves.  
The theories of James Gibson, an ‘ecological psychologist’, go some way to explaining why 
cultures develop so differently and so richly.
38
 Gibson coined his own word in connection with 
‘useful’ features of the environment: ‘affordances’. 39  Pass-throughability (openings that one can pass 
through), climbability (places one can climb on), and swimability (substances that one can swim in) 
are all ‘affordances’ in Gibson’s sense: we might add the ‘graspability’ of a piece of rag, a stick of 
wood that becomes a puppet.  
This theory is grounded on information, invariant properties of optic, haptic, acoustic structure that are relevant to an 
organism’s action capabilities. Information is out there and available to a suitably attuned organism.40  
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One way of looking at a puppet is that it is an ‘affordance’ to the puppeteer. Affordances describe 
material substance with the extra dimension of use and potential use. ‘Ordinary physical units won’t 
do’41 since each feature has to be measured relative to the organism and is specific to the organism.42  
The notion of affordances goes some way to describing the shaping of the mind by physical 
interaction with the environment and the variety of cultures which emerge. The  organism is  not  
responding to the environment via a ‘pre-programmed’ structure in the brain : to gloss Gibson, the  
stick offers itself as graspable because we have  hands. Even if we do not handle or touch the object 
(or puppet) at the time of seeing it, because of our embodied minds, we mentally gear into its possible 
affordances via its shape and form, and our perception of it is constructed, as Damasio described 
above,  by body memory of interaction with the environment (the ‘climabilities’ and 
passthroughabilities’ etc.). Arguably a puppeteer draws strongly on these (potentially creative) 
‘gearings’ into the physical world both in the  physical act of performing and in communicating with 
an audience.  
The puppet is a conduit for the puppeteer, an interface between operator and  environment, a tool 
for a performer discover interesting and amusing and unexpected affordances in the environment. 
This is part of the exploratory play of rehearsal with a puppet. Ironically, although Moses’s world is 
the stage, and in theory a world of boundless imagination, in this case, at first glance, it is a world of 
no affordances, in Gibson’s sense, whatsoever. Indeed Mark Down, director, described the process of 
prolonged rehearsing on the table as ‘pretty grim’.43 As an audience at the start of the performance we 
see little prospect of a decent puppet show and the threatened epic poem looms large. Moses’s  
‘niche’44 or set of affordances is, as he touchingly shows us round it, a flat surface a short distance 
from the floor about (as he calculates) half a metre by one metre, with four surrounding ‘cliffs’ or 
‘falling off’ places45 and that is that: no views, no horizon, no vision, no imagination and we fear, no 
possibilities. As it turns out  however, the puppeteers of course find plenty of rich ‘imagined 
affordances' on the  table top- not only its surface (which is in turn racked with  wind, coated with ice, 
transformed into a record  player turntable that slowly revolves Moses round, a CD player that throws 
him off, and a running machine that he can’t  keep up with) but also they exploit the whole mysterious 
and metaphysical (or existential) dimensions of his world (on stage and off stage, the air he sometimes 
floats in, the cavernous  space beneath and around the  table  top).  Moses’s body schema (in a human, 
we remember
46
, this is the non-conscious emergent movement patterns of one’s body- such as  ‘source 
path  goal’ already described-  deriving from interaction with the environment) is nonexistent. To 
state the obvious, the body schema is nonexistent because he is a puppet: but Moses’s poignant 
tragedy is that he could never have a body schema, and thus a mind, because his outer/material 
environment, his niche, so essential to the formation of consciousness, is so impoverished of 
affordances. Later on he jokes that his Stanislavkian ‘back story’ is a cardboard box. 
Moses is a puppet that is moved by and close to the  body and he seems to draw our attention to 
the primary metaphors as defined by Lakoff and Johnson, all deriving from bodily experience. 
Primary  metaphors are metaphors such as affection is warmth, important is big, more is up, 
difficulties are burdens, causes are physical forces- and knowing is seeing.  He does this because he is 
smaller than ourselves and we re-experience, whether as puppeteers or audience, a tiny child’s body 
and its relationship to the environment and objects, experience that we have forgotten and from which 
these metaphors derive. Puppets expose the origin of primary metaphor ‘thinking’ that has become 
obscured by habit. For example a child (and a puppet) has to try very hard to move something 
‘heavy’. This child experience develops via ‘conflation’ into the adult idea that difficulties in life are 
heavy burdens. ‘Conflation’ therefore is the development of a child’s thinking beyond the  physical 
literal experience : another example is actually seeing something (‘I see it’) conflating into the  
7 
 
primary metaphor ‘Knowing is Seeing’ (‘I see what you mean’).47 Puppets, I suggest (and here I risk a  
generalisation) do not usually operate on this post-conflation level of metaphorical thought: they tend 
to be very literal in their actions. Moses literally tries to push away physically the  problem that 
appears in his world in order to rid himself of  it- the silent  woman reading.  This is appealing to 
some audience, since the literalism can be a source of great humour in puppetry,  and irritating to 
others.
48
 Nevertheless, I suggest the appeal of the miniature, the delight in things made on a small 
scale, is in all of us. It holds a charm that is hard to explain except through this appeal to primary level 
metaphors, the very basis of our thought. A miniature physical object reminds us of a child-like level 
of operating in the world that we have forgotten but which comforts us with its familiarity.  
Moses shares this child-like connection and  also, despite his addressing an audience, inhabits an 
infinitely lonely world. Into this world suddenly breaks another: a being, a possibility of change from 
his solipsistic, narcissistic life. A woman comes and sits at his table, and reads a book.
49
 
Moses’s sudden introduction to an empathic other neatly parallels Gallagher’s  ‘disruptive 
moment’ that mirror neurons introduce into ‘the supposed indifferentiation of the earliest hours’ of an 
infant.
50
 Mirror neurons are hard scientific evidence of the shaping of our consciousness through 
interaction with others. It is now a respected theory (though again not universally accepted) that from 
soon after birth the brain is capable of empathising with the action of another through the physical 
process of firing mirror neurons in the same area of the brain that would activate if the witness were 
actually themselves doing the goal orientated action being viewed, for example reaching for a cup.
51
 It 
seems that we only become fully human through seeing or sensing others.
52
 In cognitive terms, this 
means that empathy is a naturalistic process that does not, in contrast to Simon Baron-Cohen’s theory 
of mind, involve inference or judgement of the other person’s state of mind.53 Empathy within mirror 
neuron theory is an interactive mode and in Thompson’s words it involves ‘the direct pairing or 
matching of the bodies of self and other’.54 In other words, if the theory is right, we cannot help but 
empathise with another. 
And so a silent woman comes and sits at Moses table, opening up the possibility of an empathic 
other, and a potential for growth in Moses’s sense of self. At first outraged by the cheek of this 
intruder, Moses gradually senses the possibility of his own self emerging differently, warmly, 
empathically, from this encounter. Sadly it seems this is an encounter from a parallel universe, as the 
woman, blind to his addresses, suddenly ups and leaves as strangely as she arrived without ever 
noticing him. There is no ‘direct pairing or matching’ of bodies. They exchange no speech. It is not 
just a fresh perspective on his loneliness that such a loss entails, it is that the Beckettian world of the 
table top which he inhabited more or less contentedly and innocently before now seems unbearably 
bleak to himself as well. In short it offers no possibility, ever, of change, growth and ‘seeking’, either 
through the barren environment he is in or solitary existence he leads.   
In the beginning, that is, at the time of our birth, our human capacities for perception and behavior have already been 
shaped by our movement. Prenatal bodily movement has already been organized along the lines of our own human 
shape, in proprioceptive and cross‐modal registrations, in ways that provide a capacity for experiencing a basic 
distinction between our own embodied existence and everything else. As a result, when we first open our eyes, not 
only can we see, but also our vision, imperfect as it is, is already attuned to those shapes that resemble our own 
shape. More precisely and quite literally, we can see our own possibilities in the faces of others. The infant, minutes 
after birth, is capable of imitating the gesture that it sees on the face of another person. It is thus capable of a certain 
kind of movement that foreshadows intentional action, and that propels it into a human world.55 
Moses ‘has’ no distinction between his own embodied existence and everything else; there are no 
shapes that resembled his own shape; he is not given the chance to see his own possibilities in the 
faces of others. Moses is drawn towards a human world and then torn back into existential grief and a 
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world of no other faces. The humour in this piece prevents a descent into bathos. We are dimly aware 
of the irony that the puppeteers behind Moses do have a clear distinction between their embodied 
existence and that of the puppet; that they are perfectly attuned to the shape that resembles their own 
shape, and see their possibilities in the faces of each other- and of the puppet. They habitually imitate 
the gesture, via the puppet, that they see on the face of the other person; their intentional actions are 
directed into a puppet and propel it into a human world- where it fails always and ever to be human. 
In this case, the puppeteers have made use of minimal affordances in the environment to express 
complex meanings that in the end can never be reduced to language- or to mere physicality.  
Puppets have the capacity to draw attention to the existence of the ‘lived body’ alongside the 
‘objective  body’, and Moses does exactly this. The objective body is our body (and that of others, and 
indeed of a puppet) considered as an  object- we all have the capacity for this external perspective on 
the workings of the body : it is how the body is treated in all manner of disciplines such as physiology 
or neurology.
56
 The lived body on the other hand is the embodied body, our personal experience of the 
body we inhabit. Within Evan Thompson’s interactive model of consciousness57 , as Gallese says 
‘[e]mpathy is deeply grounded in the experience of our lived body’.58  The puppeteer experiences 
their own ‘Leib’ or ‘lived body’ by, through and in the puppet and at the same time perceives the 
puppet itself as ‘Körper’ or ‘objective body’. The use of a material object in this way to draw attention 
to our predicament as material objects ourselves adds layers of complexity to the meanings offered.  
If the brain finds stability to perform complex and creative thought through the constant presence 
of the body
59
 the material bodies of puppets have the ability to remind us that this stability is only 
seemingly robust and frighteningly fragile when it is disturbed. We are in the  end  material ourselves. 
Gallagher and Zahavi describe a game of tennis. ‘Your body tightens in order to return the ball in a 
masterful smash, but suddenly you feel a sharp and intense pain in your chest. Your smashing 
opportunity is lost and the pain is now demanding all your attention....There is nothing that reminds us 
of our embodiment (our vulnerability and mortality) as much as pain’.60 Gallagher and Zahavi see this 
experience as one that objectifies the body suddenly and gives us access to what is normally lost to us: 
‘the smooth functioning of our body in perception and action as the constant and pervasive support 
system for our cognitive life’.61 There is nothing more fragile than Moses’s body as he stands in an 
agony of loneliness as the woman retreats from his table. 
Emotion in relation to the puppet takes us beyond- or further into- its materiality. Gibson 
concentrates on the physical or ecological level of psychology, and so offers us only a limited insight 
into the formation  and experience  consciousness which is imbued with emotion.
62
 For humanity, 
working of materials is so much more than physical. The puppet for example, as a material 
‘affordance’ to the puppeteer, clearly involves emotion and thought, adding cognitive complexity 
beyond simple physical interaction. 
The objective body of a puppet, clearly, can arouse empathy: it does this via, as Gallese suggests 
above, the lived body that animates it and the audience that watches. In Gallagher’s book 
Brainstorming, he interposes  ‘A Short Robotic Interlude’ amidst his exploration of consciousness via 
motion, intersubjectivity, emotion, empathy and language.
63
 At one point scientists describe a project 
where robots are used to help autistic children relate to the world since they avoid the subtle, 
unpredictable and potentially confusing social behaviours of humans. However  Gallagher states: 
‘Currently there is good evidence to suggest that mirror neurons, which are activated when we see 
others engaged in intentional actions, are not activated when we see mechanical things do the things 
that could be done by people’.64 There is however  every reason for mirror neurons to fire when we 
see a puppet reach for something, because it is not mechanical: when  held, it takes on, to a greater  or 
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lesser extent,  the  embodied force of the puppeteer’s bodily movements, more obviously since 
puppeteers are rarely hidden in contemporary performance, and activate the body memory of the 




 identifies basic animal (mammalian) emotions (which Moses experiences) as anger and 
fear of abandonment ; the basic emotional systems are rough and tumble play (which is comparable to 
Moses on his turntables and  running  machines) and the ‘seeking’ mechanism, that is, the  ‘high’ we 
get from fully engaging in an activity we really enjoy (‘seeking’ which can also lead to drug abuse) : 
arguably Moses gets a taste of  this when he meets the silent woman, though it is snatched from  him. 
Emotions are, basically, chemical releases into the brain.
 66
 Whether as Panksepp claims emotions 
originate deep in the brain or in the somato-sensory cortex (which is where Damasio, in contrast to 
Panksepp, would place  emotions) matters not for my main point here, namely that the physical and 
emotional are linked, each affecting  the other: ‘Emotive circuits change the sensitivities of sensory 
systems that are relevant for the behavioural sequences that have been aroused’.67 In turn body 
memory can trigger past emotion. This reveals something about the emotional engagement that 
puppets arouse, and may have relevance to other modes of ‘low’ or popular performance, namely 
masks, clowning and slap-stick. Because puppets have a limited physical range distilled from the 
subtleties of the somato-motor system of the puppeteer, they always begin their physical encounter 
with us differently, and hence, I would argue, provoke a different level of emotional response from, 
say, Hamlet or Hedda Gabler. The quality of their physical movement is comparable, and linked, to 
their tendency to operate at the pre-conflation level that precedes metaphorical language explored  
earlier. This does not make them childish, but it often makes them child-like, that is, simple (in the 
best possible sense) and direct conduits of basic emotion. Puppets can be emotionally engaging 
characters, but our empathy may be rooted in the nature of the physical  gestures they are able to 
make, which ultimately are  always  child-like. Ronnie Burkett’s crafted string puppets (such as those 
in Happy 2001) or Handspring Theatre’s marionette portées (such as the lead characters in Or You 
Could Kiss Me (2010)) overlay sophisticated and thus ‘post conflation’ language so that, as well as  
having complex emotional lives, they also seem to engage with us at a child-like emotional level that 
can be upsetting, and even deeply disturbing. In the case of Handspring’s  Or You Could Kiss Me the 
child like dimension is sensitively dealt with, even exploited through the vulnerability of the leading 
characters. Burkett, despite his brilliance in operating the puppets, does not always get the balance 
right when he gives his characters such full adult  lives, including sexuality. Faulty Optic’s  roughly 
(but  ingeniously) made Mabel (Snuffhouse Dustlouse [1991]1999) busies herself one handedly, 
clumsily, obsessively- and pointlessly- around her dimly  lit rubbish strewn house, her sad existence 
deriving from an abusive childhood. The emotion aroused by a  puppet, an object in motion, is 
connected to the  type of movement  it makes. The puppet keys us emotionally into an affective level 
that only puppets- and objects- can touch.  
Fauconnier and Turner’s conceptual blending, which was adapted earlier as a model to analyse 
audience reception of Moses’s appearance, is rigorous, scholarly and insightful: it is also largely 
abstract (ignoring the body) and almost entirely linguistic. The challenge is to penetrate non-linguistic 
‘thought’, that is, the ‘thought’ that arises with no verbalisation at all, such as sculpting, weaving or 
painting: or creating and watching a puppet. 
Mandler’s work indicates that in babies, thought precedes language and can exist without being 
translated into words.
 68
 A promising start on expanding the notion of conceptual blending into non 
verbalised thought has been made by Hutchins’s demonstration of the way material anchors can 
expand thinking.
69
 Inspired by  Hutchins’s work on navigation as a complex space of ‘shared 
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cognition’ dependent on material objects or instruments , Evelyn Tribble has applied this to 
Shakespeare’s Globe Theatre.70  Puppetry is an example of a space of shared cognition almost entirely 
dependent on expanding  thought through the use of material objects. This is evident in Blind Summit 
rehearsing The Table as the puppeteers play, endlessly improvising with the puppets and props 
discovering new affordances, some of which move the piece along, and some of which prove dead 
ends that cannot dramaturgically be absorbed and so are abandoned.
71
 Their rehearsal is a space of 
active and shared cognition where thought is developed through objects in a social space: children do 
this in play continually
72
 but it is also apparent in performance. Here the space of shared cognition is 
obvious, active and energetic. It is often signalled by laughter in the audience as performers push 
ideas further in response to audience reaction. When an extract from The Table was performed at the 
Wellcome Collection’s ‘Objects of Emotion’73 Moses (in deconstructive mode) was demonstrating 
what can go wrong in the connection between puppet and puppeteer and, after sliding around the 
surface of his table and illustrating various other cardinal sins of poor puppeteering, the hapless 
Moses not only floated away off his surface but travelled further and further up the aisles of the 
lecture theatre. The audience were fully contributing to the shared space of cognition with the 
puppeteer as they encouraged him to push the idea to extremes. 
  
In exploring a  cognitive approach to puppetry  I have done so largely through a  specific example 
of The Table, arguably well suited to such an  analysis. In doing so I have referred in passing to other 
puppeteers and companies but the caution I exercised in doing so makes me fully aware of the 
difficulties Tillis demonstrated so long ago, that exceptions can usually be found to any a 
generalisiations about a ‘puppet’. Even so, I believe the cognitive analysis could be usefully applied 
widely within puppet and object theatre to help our understanding of its enigmatic dynamics, and this 
is an attempt to open up the  field to the ‘cognitive turn’. Some general principles are possible to point 
the way. 
Ideas are not necessarily expressed in language: meaning may be expressed visually, experienced 
haptically, and may never become articulated in words. This is much harder to grasp and justify than a 
superficial reading suggests. It demands carefully unpacking  it in terms of consciousness, the sense of  
self, Damasio’s ‘feeling of what happens’, and the phenomenological moment of so-called non 
thinking.
74
 Since 90% of the mind’s activities is, neuroscience claims, subconscious (and not in a 
Freudian  sense) I suggest that theatre has the  power -momentarily, richly, and sometimes delicately- 
to expand our consciousness into these unperceived reaches of the  mind. In this way we experience 
on stage the very essence of creative thinking and the imagination in action, a moment that can 
subsequently be analysed if we wish in terms of conceptual blending, metaphorical truth, and basic 
schemas of thought. With this in mind puppetry, as a physical medium of communication, can key 
into what is normally lost to us, so that we notice both the normally unremarked and also  precarious 
nature of our self hood. Hutchins claims that stability amidst cognitive complexity can emerge from 
material anchors in conceptual blends, objects that extend thinking out into the material world, and the 
stronger the anchor the more daring the brain can be in its blending.
75
 Puppetry’s ‘conceptual blends’ 
and those of our protaganist Moses, are indeed daring, imaginative and complex, and the more so, as 
Hutchins might suggest, because of their anchoring in environmental affordances, materials  and the 
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